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Behavioral economics is changing our understanding of how economic policy operates, including
tax policy. In this paper, we consider some implications of behavioral economics for tax policy, such
as how it changes our understanding of the welfare consequences of taxation, the relative desirability
of using the tax system as a platform for policy implementation, and the role of taxes as an element
of policy design. We do so by reviewing the logic of specific features of tax policy in light of recent
findings in areas such as tax salience, program take-up, and fiscal stimulus.
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Rahm Emmanuel, the current White House Chief of Staff, has famously been quoted as 
saying that: “You don’t ever want a crisis to go to waste; it’s an opportunity to do important 
things that you would otherwise avoid” (Zeleny and Calmes, 2008). The recent crisis—the 
recession and the associated financial emergency—represents such an opportunity for a wide 
range of economic policies, including tax policy. This is true not just in some political or 
operational sense: as an opportunity to accomplish policies we would otherwise avoid. But also 
from a scientific perspective: as an opportunity to reconsider the intellectual foundations of 
economic policy in ways we might otherwise not be motivated or encouraged to do. 
In this paper, we link this opportunity to rethink aspects of the standard economic 
approach to tax policy with a compelling cause for doing so. We argue that the implications of 
behavioral economics—the integration of economics and the psychology of preference formation 
and choice—for public policy, including tax policy, have yet to be systematically explored, and 
that this oversight leads to both mistaken policy and missed opportunity. Behavioral economists 
have now accumulated several decades of findings indicating that the standard economic 
assumptions about individual behavior are not accurate, that people do not act rationally, that 
they are not perfectly self-interested, and that they hold inconsistent preferences. Moreover, and 
especially in recent years, policy economists have increasingly come to see that these deviations 
from the standard assumptions about behavior matter for economic policy. The most celebrated 
example is the use of defaults in retirement savings: policies encouraging firms to automatically 
enroll their workers in 401(k) plans, rather than waiting for individuals to sign up on their own, 
seem to encourage participation and savings in those plans to an extent that is extremely difficult 
to rationalize under standard assumptions about preference and choice (Madrian and Shea, 
2001).   2
Here we take up the question of how to think about incorporating results from behavioral 
economics into tax policy. Because a complete reconceptualization of tax policy from the ground 
up is beyond the scope of a single review paper, we take the approach of working through the 
implications of behavioral economics in a series of extended examples, from three distinct levels 
of analysis for tax policy: (1) understanding the welfare consequences of taxation; (2) using the 
tax system as a platform for policy implementation; and (3) employing taxes as an element of 
policy design. 
Welfare consequences. Perhaps the central concern of tax policy, from the perspective of 
economics, is understanding how taxes matter for welfare in order to better design taxes that are 
maximally efficient and equitable. To do this, economists have developed models of deadweight 
loss and incidence. And based on these models, derived results for what optimal taxes look 
like—results along the lines of Mirlees (1971) for taxes on labor, and along the lines of Ramsey 
(1927) for commodity taxes. In applying these models to the practical matter of policy design, 
these results are often incorporated by way of rules of thumb for what “good” taxes look like: 
they are simple, they impose low rates on wide tax bases, they are imposed on relatively inelastic 
goods, and so on. Crucially, however, the underlying models that generate these results depend 
centrally on how individuals respond to taxation. In the standard model, the key factors for 
understanding both tax efficiency and tax incidence are elasticities. But elasticities are simply a 
parameterization of a behavioral response. And behavioral economics shows that how people 
respond to taxes is less straightforward than the standard model supposes. Imperfectly rational 
people will respond to taxes in a way that is mediated by psychology. In this paper, we review 
the case for rethinking tax simplicity.   3
Platform for policy implementation. For a number of reasons, both economic and 
practical, a wide variety of public policies operate through the tax system. So, for example, some 
transfer policies, like the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), are a part of the tax system. But 
other platforms are available. Transfers, for example, can be done as standalone programs such 
as the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. Determining whether or 
when it is desirable to implement policy through the tax code depends in part on how individuals 
behave. That is, it depends not on how individuals respond to the taxes themselves, but how they 
interact with the features of the system in place for tax collection. The issue we discuss here is 
the attractive automaticity of the tax system. 
Element of policy design. Taxes are one tool among many in the policymaker toolbox. So 
for example, in discussions of policy options for curbing carbon emissions, one tool 
policymakers can reach for is a carbon tax. In some sense, the core idea of using taxes as an 
element of policy design is that tax policy can be used to change behavior. And as behavioral 
economics has informed how economists understand individual behavior, it also informs how 
economists understand what levers are more or less effective for changing behavior. As a result, 
behavioral economics changes standard conclusions about the usefulness and effectiveness of 
taxes as elements of policy. We discuss this in the context of the problem of understanding how 
best to use taxes for fiscal stimulus.  
 
Behavioral economics 
Before discussing the implications of behavioral economics for tax policy, though, a brief 
review of the relevant dimensions of behavioral economics is in order. The general contention of 
behavioral economics is that the usual assumptions made in economics about how individuals   4
form and express preferences—that they are perfectly rational, that they are perfectly self-
interested, and so on—are not accurate representations of how individuals in fact think and 
choose. This is, in one respect, not especially revelatory. These are simplifying assumptions, 
used primarily for tractability in modeling and not intended as a real description of the world. 
They survive within economics not because they are necessarily true, but because they are 
useful.  
But behavioral economics goes further than merely observing that these assumptions 
sometimes fail, in two respects. First, behavioral economics argues that the standard assumptions 
are so consistently violated as to be neither literally true nor useful as modeling assumptions. 
Second, that people violate those assumptions in identifiable and predictable ways. Psychologists 
and behavioral economists have collected a lot of evidence about the specific behavioral 
tendencies individuals exhibit, such as mental accounting, loss aversion, and hyperbolic 
discounting. For the purposes of thinking about tax policy, it is sufficient to understand these 
psychological insights aggregated at a relatively broad level, primarily in terms of the violations 
from the standard assumptions that they represent. At this level, there are two basic classes of 
deviations: individuals are imperfectly rational, and they hold non-standard preferences. 
Imperfect rationality. Imperfect rationality captures the general finding that individuals 
are not especially good at choosing optimally. On the one hand, this is because individuals seem 
to find it hard to know what is optimal. They have only limited attention to devote to choice, 
leading them to be more like local than global optimizers. And they possess only limited 
computational capacity, meaning that they have trouble even optimizing at all. Mental 
accounting is an example of individuals failing to choose optimally in this way (Thaler, 1980). 
On the other hand, individuals are not effective optimizers because they seem to find it hard to   5
do what is optimal. They possess only bounded self-control, and can have difficulty realizing 
their intentions. Hyperbolic discounting is an example of individuals failing to behave optimally 
in this way (Laibson, 1997). 
Non-standard preferences. The category of non-standard preferences captures the finding 
that individuals seem to have preferences that are inconsistent with even the weak assumptions 
standard economic models place on the form of preferences. That is, what individuals want is not 
what economists typically assume. One such result is the finding of other-regarding preferences. 
People are not always perfectly self-interested—they care about the welfare of others, and they 
care about fairness (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Kahnemen, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986). Another 
such result is reference dependence. People appear to form preferences around reference points. 
Loss aversion is an example of such preferences (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
 
Rethinking tax simplicity 
The core of the economics of taxation is understanding the welfare effects of taxation. 
This dimension of the economics of taxation is concerned with generating results about how to 
raise revenue efficiently and fairly. This is done theoretically, in the optimal taxation literature, 
and from there leads to practical rules for tax policy design. With behavioral agents, these rules 
become somewhat less certain. Welfare results—both for efficiency and equity—depend on how 
individuals respond to taxes. Because the way in which imperfectly rational people respond to 
taxes will be mediated by psychology, results from behavioral economics will possibly change 
conclusions about optimal taxation in a wide variety of ways. Here we focus on the evidence and 
logic of one aspect of this, which is that behavioral economics leads to a rethinking of tax 
simplicity.   6
One of the practical design rules that comes out of standard welfare analysis of taxation is 
that, other things being equal and in very general terms, simplicity is a goal of tax policy. Partly 
this is because simplicity is associated with efficiency. Low tax rates on large bases, which are 
relatively efficient, are simple relative to taxes with lots of exceptions to the definition of 
income, which lead to smaller bases and higher rates. This conclusion also follows in part from 
the effects of complexity on the costs of tax compliance and administration. Complex tax codes 
are harder for people to comply with and more costly for authorities to administer. While there 
are often real benefits to many complicating features of the tax code that can be weighed against 
these costs, in general there is a tendency to view measures that complicate the tax code as more 
often the result of political motivations than economic ones. 
Behavioral economics allows for behavioral responses to complexity that add nuance to, 
and may even in some cases overturn, this conclusion. While the traditional case for tax 
simplicity is indirect, related to achieving broad tax bases, or administrative, the behavioral 
approach suggests that the degree of simplicity directly enters the optimal tax calculation. There 
are at least three elements of this added nuance. First, complexity can affect behavioral responses 
to otherwise economically equivalent taxes. Second, complexity can be used as a screening 
mechanism to promote efficiency. Third, complexity may aid attainment of social goals.  
Complexity, behavioral response, and welfare. Perhaps the major implication of 
behavioral economics for the welfare consequences of tax complexity comes from the fact that 
imperfectly rational individuals can no longer be assumed to perceive taxes correctly. Individuals 
will respond not to the tax rate as it is set, but as they construe it. The welfare consequences of 
this are not clear-cut. Moreover, it raises questions about whether policymakers could be 
improving welfare outcomes by deliberately manipulating tax salience, and how. Consider two   7
cases: salience effects, where consumers may fail to perceive complex or obscure taxes 
accurately or at all, and benefit taxes, where the welfare implications of taxation depend on 
consumers making the connection between taxes and the benefits they fund. 
Evidence suggests that salience effects are present with respect to both commodity and 
labor taxes. In the case of commodity taxes, research has shown that some taxes are all but 
ignored by consumers. In one widely cited study, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (forthcoming) show 
that individuals largely ignore sales taxes—taxes that are not ordinarily included in marked 
prices—on taxed items in a supermarket. A related piece of evidence comes from the work of 
Finkelstein (2009) who studies the effects of automated toll collection, finding that individuals 
pay less attention to tolls collected in this less salient manner. In the case of taxes on labor, 
emerging evidence finds that the behavioral response to income taxes is also muted by their 
complexity. Saez (2009) finds little evidence that taxpayers bunch at kink points in the income 
tax schedule, a result consistent with imperfectly rational taxpayers failing to accurately perceive 
a complex and opaque tax code. Additional evidence comes from Chetty and Saez (2009), who 
find a behavioral response to an intervention providing information about the EITC schedule, 
suggesting an imperfect understanding of the relevant tax schedule in the absence of the 
intervention. 
Results such as these raise questions as to what optimal tax policy is or should be with 
respect to tax salience. To some extent, the degree to which taxes are salient is a choice variable 
for policymakers. For example, policymakers can set commodity taxes as sales taxes, which are 
typically not posted in the price the consumer sees, or they can set commodity taxes as excise 
taxes, which typically are. There is work that bears on this question, for example Slemrod and 
Kopczuk (2002) develop a model in which the government can affect the relevant elasticity. But   8
the theoretical literature has yet to yield the type of rules of thumb with respect to optimal tax 
salience that translate into practical policy recommendations. When policymakers can choose to 
keep some taxes hidden from consumers, this will keep the elasticity low, which, other things 
equal, is desirable for efficiency purpose. But with a binding budget constraint, spending too 
much on the good with a hidden tax will leave less income for subsequent purchases—distorting 
individual consumption and decreasing welfare. Resolving the net welfare consequences of tax 
salience is thus an important future line of research.  
Complexity may possibly lead to positive welfare gains in the case of benefit taxes—such 
as the Social Security payroll tax or unemployment taxes—where the tax funds an identifiable 
benefit. The standard way of modeling the incidence and efficiency of taxes with this property is 
usually analogous to the welfare consequences of mandated benefits (Summers, 1989). In a 
behavioral world, however, it can no longer be assumed that merely implementing a benefit tax 
leads to a tax being perceived as such by those on whom it falls. So, for example, Liebman and 
Zeckhauser (2004) raise the possibility that imperfectly rational individuals may ignore the claim 
to Social Security benefits they accrue by paying the Social Security payroll tax, a behavior they 
memorably label as “ostriching.” In this case, complexity, at least a particular variety of tightly 
controlled complexity, can improve outcomes. Having a separate tax schedule and system does 
introduce inefficiencies. It doubles up on some administrative functions, and it leads to different 
definitions of income and tax bases. But this same complexity is also likely to be useful in 
getting individuals to connect, for example, Social Security taxes with Social Security benefits. 
Certainly, it seems that individuals in the current system are more likely to make that connection 
than under an alternative in which payroll taxes are folded in to the income tax. And by   9
promoting this connection to individuals, it likely makes them more apt to treat the tax as a 
mandated benefit. 
Complexity, screening and welfare. A related but separate consideration appears in 
allowing for varying degrees of sophistication about tax complexity. Take the following 
example: social returns to education are high, and as a result a tax credit for education is 
desirable. Assume, however, that variation in the social return to education across individuals is 
correlated with their being savvy about tax complexity. To make the example simple, assume 
two types: one type has social return and is savvy, and the other type has only private return and 
is not savvy. With a simple tax credit, then everyone participates and the government subsidizes 
the type that only generates private return as well as the social return type. With a complicated 
credit, only the savvy respond, and the subsidy is provided only to those who generate a social 
return, improving the targeting efficiency of the subsidy. 
Complexity, social goals, and welfare. Finally, complexity and imperfectly rational 
behavior can combine to create new opportunities for tax policy to achieve social goals. One 
situation where complexity can create such an opportunity is when the complexity of a tax leads 
individuals to respond to a tax in error, but that error leads individuals to respond in a way that 
fits with policymakers’—and possibly society’s—preferences. For example, the result that the 
EITC strongly encourages work may be due in part to the fact that the EITC follows a 
complicated schedule, to which recipients can bring only limited attention and limited 
computational resources. What evidence is available does suggest that EITC eligible individuals 
do possess only imperfect knowledge of how the credit operates (Smeeding, Ross Phillips and 
O'Connor, 2000; Ross Phillips, 2001; Chetty and Saez, 2009). The evidence of the impact of the 
EITC on labor force participation and hours worked is consistent with a model in which   10
individuals only understand the work incentives of the EITC in some approximate sense. For 
instance, an increase in labor force participation with little effect on hours worked could be a 
result of workers understanding the average effects of the EITC on earnings but not the marginal 
effects—a variant of “schmeduling,” in the terminology of Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004). The 
key is to note that, while this is an error on the individual level, from society’s perspective, this 
may be thought of as desirable. It may even be possible to combine schmeduling with hidden 
taxes so that individuals respond in ways that incorporate income effects (from schmeduling) 
while reducing distortions from substitution effects (from hidden taxes). 
Another opportunity created by behavioral economics for attaining social goals with 
complex tax policy comes about due to the ambiguous relationship of tax complexity to tax 
fairness. That is, from recognizing that there is a welfare component to taxation that is about 
preferences, rather than behavioral response. Behavioral economics stresses that individuals are 
not, in practice, perfectly self-interested. They care about the welfare of others and they care 
about the fairness of the process that generates outcomes. There are several implications for the 
relationship between complexity and welfare. The first is simply that the fairest tax code may not 
be the simplest. In that case, preferences for an equitable or fair tax system that may require 
some degree of complexity will compete with the costs of complexity. Another is that it likely 
matters for welfare results, more than is typically supposed, what people believe their taxes are 
being used for. Behavioral economics, in other words, may make the consideration of balanced 
budget incidence more crucial in judging the true incidence of taxes. In general, since the usual 
assumptions about preferences are difficult to justify, models and calculations of efficiency and 
incidence should be more careful about considering welfare effects of this nature.   11
Of course, many of the standard drawbacks of tax complexity still remain even in the 
presence of behavioral agents. And, in fact, there are some reasons to believe that tax complexity 
along some dimensions is even more costly with behavioral agents than with perfectly rational 
agents. The costs, for example, of compliance with a complex tax code are possibly much larger 
with imperfectly rational individuals. And complexity probably dooms the effectiveness of some 
desirable aspects of the tax code. For example, complex subsidies to retirement savings may not 
be effective, as in the case of the Savers’ Credit (Duflo et al., 2006). Taken all together, 
behavioral economics does not so much suggest that tax simplicity is less or more desirable than 
in the standard model, so much as it changes and complicates the relationship between simplicity 
and welfare. 
 
The attractive automaticity of the tax system 
  Another dimension to tax policy is that the administrative apparatus that has been built to 
levy and collect taxes is often used in order to implement policies that sometimes have very little 
to do with taxes per se. Perhaps the clearest example of this is with transfer policies such as the 
EITC. Policies like the EITC are a near substitute for standalone transfer policies, such as TANF 
or food stamps. But the one is implemented through the tax system, and the others are not. The 
tax system is used for a variety of such purposes, from subsidizing higher education to 
encouraging particular forms of saving. On the one hand, such programs impose administrative 
challenges and monitoring costs on tax agencies, and add to compliance costs by further 
complicating an already burdensome tax problem. On the other hand, the marginal burdens—for 
tax administrators and benefit claimants alike—may be smaller when they are added to the tax 
system in this way rather than implemented as a separate program requiring its own   12
administrative devices and application and take up processes. This is the primary tradeoff in 
judging when implementing policies through the tax system is likely to be worthwhile relative to 
available alternatives. Behavioral economics changes the terms of this tradeoff, so that different 
conclusions might be reached about when it is appropriate to implement policy through the tax 
code and when it is not when the targets of such policies are imperfectly rational. One way in 
which the tax code becomes an even more attractive apparatus for implementing policy in a 
behavioral world is that it features an attractive automaticity. 
    The automaticity of implementing programs through the tax code comes from the 
structure of the existing tax system, especially the income tax system. Paying income taxes is 
nearly automatic, from the perspective of many individuals, due to features like tax withholding. 
And even settling taxes, as painful as that can be, is relatively automatic compared with other 
government programs: filing taxes is difficult, but not necessarily more difficult than is, say, 
applying for food stamps. In fact, filing taxes is in some respects easier and more automatic. For 
example, while the government requires that individuals are sent the documentation they need—
W-2s, 1099s, and so forth— in order to file their taxes, an application for food stamps can 
require a paperwork burden that can be equally daunting, but individuals are largely left to 
collect their own documentation and records. Finally, while there are notable exceptions, the tax 
system is relatively distinct in that a robust and widespread network of third parties has arisen 
that make settlement even more automatic—either by selling filers simplifying software, or the 
service of preparing taxes outright. 
    The attractiveness of the automaticity of the tax system comes from the fact that 
accumulating evidence suggests that barriers to taking up programs, even minor barriers such as 
application costs or waiting times, can discourage program participation out of proportion to the   13
magnitude of the costs they impose (Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir, 2006). That human 
frailties—procrastinating filing a form, or being put off by the tediousness or hassle of 
completing it, or failing to understand program rules—can lead qualifying individuals to forgo 
benefits. Moreover, there is a concern in such an environment that program non-participants are 
then not those who value the program the least but instead those who understood the rules the 
least or faced the biggest procrastination problem. Such barriers to take up may induce an 
unattractive selection in program participants. In some cases, such as transfer programs, those 
most put off by complex or burdensome program application requirements might be the very 
target population. As a result, this feature of the tax system, as it happens to exist, intersects with 
an element of policy design emphasized by behavioral findings. There are several examples of 
how policy can or might exploit that intersection. 
Transfers. To continue with the example given above, policies that seek to redistribute or 
alleviate hardship can be operated either as standalone policies or as part of the tax code. At the 
broadest level, such policies can be thought of as part of the parameterization of redistribution in 
either case.  However,  in this paper, we only consider the administrative and implementation 
issues. To qualify for food stamps, in most cases individuals have to complete a cumbersome 
application process. To qualify for the EITC requires a marginal set of steps on a tax return that 
many qualifying individuals would file in any event. The take up rates reflect this difference: 
Estimates suggest that only about 67 percent of eligible individuals receive food stamps, while 
the EITC may reach as many as 94 percent of eligible households (Wolkwitz, 2008; Blumenthal,  
Erard, and  Ho, 2005). This discrepancy and the causes for it should ideally inform discussions 
of how to administer such programs. Finally, note that while the main existing choices are 
between operating policies as part of the tax code or as standalone programs, an innovative third   14
option is being tested in a number of contexts that attempts to operate enrollment into such 
programs alongside the tax system. These promising experiments start from the observation that 
much of the information needed for determining eligibility for such programs is already 
contained on the tax return. Noting this, these experiments take the approach of taking 
information off of individual tax returns at the time of filing and using it to assist them in 
applying for existing programs, such as financial aid for college (Bettinger, Long, and 
Oreopoulos, 2009). There are ways that policy could further promote these efforts, such as by 
synchronizing the timing of the financial aid cycle in college admissions with the tax season. 
Savings. Automatic features of the tax code can also be used to improve the 
implementation of policies that aim to encourage personal savings, including retirement savings. 
Many tax filers receive refunds, and a large and growing fraction elect to receive those refunds 
through direct deposit. When an individual files taxes, it is a relatively trivial portion of the 
process to specify where that refund will go. Policy can encourage directing all or a portion of 
refunds into accounts where they are likely to be saved rather than spent—Tufano, Schneider, 
and Beverly (2005) have called this a “savable moment.” One recent policy innovation to 
encourage this behavior has been the advent of split refunds. Since 2007, individuals have been 
able to split their refunds across multiple accounts, including savings accounts and IRAs. 
Evidence suggests that this policy might work to encourage saving (Beverly, Scheider, and 
Tufano, 2006).  
Health insurance. Finally, consider the policy problem of expanding health insurance 
coverage. This is a clear example of a policy goal that, in itself, has little if anything to do with 
taxes. But looking at both recent and proposed reforms, it seems clear that efforts to expand 
health insurance coverage will consider seriously the possibility of interacting with the tax   15
system. Here, too, such policies can potentially make use of the automatic features of the tax 
system. Where increased coverage is pursued through the expansion of public programs, such as 
Medicaid, this could take the form of aligning in some ways the enrollment process with the tax 
filing process. For example, while approximately 21 percent of children eligible for Medicaid or 
SCHIP are estimated to be uninsured, roughly 90 percent of those children live in families that 
file a federal income tax return. Based on this, and the fact that the tax return already contains 
much of the information necessary to determine Medicaid eligibility, Stan Dorn and others have 
proposed methods for using the tax system to promote enrollment in these programs (2009).  
Even where health insurance expansions are proposed to take the form of some kind of 
individual mandate, there are automatic features of the tax system that could be an integral part 
of making enrollment as easy as possible. The Massachusetts plan, for example, verifies its 
health insurance mandate through the state income tax return. A national plan could be modeled 
after the Massachusetts plan along these lines, yet go even further by modifying the tax form to 
collect health insurance status and then using this information to do automatic enrollment for free 
insurance (if determination can be made based on the previous year’s income) and to proactively 
reach out to those eligible for subsidized insurance. And if tax returns were to shift to a return-
free filing system in the future, data from insurers on who is covered could be matched with tax 
returns to calculate eligibility for free or subsidized insurance as the first step in automatic 
enrollment.  
A national plan for health insurance coverage expansion could also leverage the tax 
system’s collections infrastructure and facilitate enrollment by deducting estimated premiums 
through paycheck withholding, transferring those amounts to a health insurance connector to be 
applied to a policy of the individuals’ choice. For instance, contributions could be collected   16
through withholding with the IRS sending pre-filled W4 forms to individuals allowing voluntary 
collection of their share of premiums. Our estimates, based on tabulations of the Current 
Population Survey, indicate that of the 45 million uninsured, as many as 29 million live in a 
family with someone who, at some point in the year, worked at a firm with 10 or more people. A 
tax-withholding based system that applied to such workers could thus conceivably facilitate 
enrollment of two-thirds of the uninsured in any given year. 
 
Taxes and fiscal policy 
Finally, the use of taxes to achieve fiscal policy ends is a good, and timely, example of 
using taxes as a tool of policy. A goal of fiscal policy is to achieve macroeconomic 
stabilization—in the current crisis the task has been to stimulate the economy in the face of slack 
aggregate demand. Alternative forms of tax cuts for this purpose are judged against each other 
and against spending proposals according to the “bang for the buck” each is believed to deliver. 
And for this purpose, there exist a standard set of design rules of thumb for what a fiscal stimulus 
should look like—for example, that the timing of the stimulus should match the moment of slack 
demand. What behavioral economics adds to this analysis is to suggest that design rules at this 
level are, by themselves, insufficient for ensuring tax cuts are an effective stimulus. Because 
individuals are imperfectly rational, small changes in the way tax cuts are presented or delivered 
can affect how individuals respond. A literature evaluating these effects has generated some 
results. 
Framing tax cuts. One lesson is that the framing of tax cuts can affect whether and when 
they are spent, and thus their stimulative impact. The results of experimental work by Epley, 
Mak, and Idson (2006) provide the primary piece of evidence that this is the case. The authors   17
find that tax cuts presented as a “bonus” might be more likely to be spent than tax cuts presented 
as a “rebate”. The authors interpret this as a result of reference dependence—that when 
individuals perceive the tax cut as a gain (a “bonus”) rather than as a foregone loss (a “rebate”), 
they are more likely to spend the tax cut. 
Delivering tax cuts. Another lesson is that how tax cuts are delivered can affect whether 
and how they are spent. The most recent stimulus bill, for example, the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, rather than providing a lump sum tax cut (either as a rebate or a 
bonus), delivered its primary tax cut in the form of reduced withholding. The idea being that tax 
cuts that reduce withholding might be more effective than lump sum rebates. This was based in 
part on past experiences that suggest a greater willingness to spend out of reduced withholding, 
such as shown in Shapiro and Slemrod (1995), which found a propensity to spend out of a 
reduction in withholding rates even in the absence of a change in the tax rate. Additionally, a 
recent laboratory experiment done by Chambers and Spencer (2008) found subjects were more 
likely to plan to spend a hypothetical tax cut delivered as many small payments rather than one 
delivered as a lump sum.  
Finally, while not the focus here, note that deviations from the standard model of 
behavior have obvious implications for understanding the macroeconomics of policies such as 
these. Akerlof and Shiller (2009) provide an overview of the potential role of behavioral 
economics in macroeconomics and macroeconomic policy. 
 
Conclusion 
While behavioral economics does not yet provide firm and detailed answers for how tax 
policy should best reflect the fact that individuals are not perfectly rational, it clearly raises   18
relevant and important questions. The available evidence, from economics and from psychology, 
both provokes doubt about some of the standard conclusions in tax policy and points the way to 
some tentative new conclusions. But the process of reconsidering those results in full, and the 
theoretical and empirical research that it ultimately requires, is just now beginning. 
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